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a litigant's state-created right be achieved, and encroachment upon his
right to an independent federal trial be stemmed.
The delineation of state and federal law which is necessary to pre-
serve this equilibrium cannot be attained by so-called "tests" which pur-
port to categorize various "procedural" rules on the basis of correlations
supposed to exist between the categories into which the rules are fitted,
and the rights which the rules represent. The Byrd-Simler approach does
not create a talismanic dichotomy which separates state and federal control
over diversity litigation, but it does succeed in laying bare the issues in
a manner never before achieved. The return to the principles of federal-
ism which is required by this approach, while it does not offer expediency,
affords a basis upon which federal courts may build a sound delineation
between state and federal authority.
SEGREGATION LITIGATION IN THE 1960'S: IS THERE AN
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INTEGRATE THE SCHOOLS?
The flood of school segregation litigation has spilled over the dike
of the Mason-Dixon line into the courtrooms of the northern states. This
litigation in the north subsequent to the decision in Brozmz v. Board of
Education' is a relatively new phenomenon, occurring mainly in the last
three years, and presents a number of new legal issues for analysis. Liti-
gation centers around the administration of most northern school systems
on the neighborhood school plan which in many instances has resulted in
extensive racial imbalance within individual schools of a system.' The
problem has been labeled in much of the recent literature as "de facto"
segregation. This choice of labels is unfortunate for in the context of
public school litigation segregation is a legal conclusion and implies un-
constitutionality; thus, the label assumes the conclusion of the issue.
The major legal problem arising from this factual context is whether
racial imbalance is unconstitutional in and of itself. The determination
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. The use of the neighborhood school plan as the primary method of school
organization is so widespread and so traditional that exact figures as to the extent of
its use do not seem to be available. "Attendance zones constitute the time-honored
method of apportioning children among schools. . . ." [1961] 2 Comm'N oN CIVIL
RIGHTS REP. 20. Apparently educational researchers have never felt it worthwhile
to determine exactly what per cent of the nation's school systems operate on this plan.
However, a rough indication of its extensive use is given by a recent nation-wide poll
of school administrators in which 95 per cent of those replying favored neighborhood
schools. Sanctlio Neighborhood Attendance Policy, 70 NATION'S SCHOOLs 55 (Jul. 1962).
The term racial imbalance is used in this note to denote the disproportionate repre-
sentation of white and Negro races within the schools of a system.
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of the problem depends on whether the holding of the Brown decision is
applicable to the racial imbalance which results from the administration
of the neighborhood school plan, or, if not, whether the underlying ra-
tionale of Brown justifies extending its holding to encompass this area.
It is the contention of this note that neither the holding nor rationale of
Brown furnishes a legal ground for deciding that racial imbalance in a
school system is unconstitutional.
A second problem of the school racial imbalance situation is whether
children can lawfully be compelled to attend neighborhood schools which
are demonstrably inferior in educational facilities and opportunities to
other schools in a system. Investigation of this problem may reveal a
solution to the legal controversy over racially imbalanced schools alterna-
tive to the Brown rationale. A third problem involves the legal principles
called into play by a positive attempt to integrate a school system, whether
by court order or voluntary action of a school board. To deal adequately
with all three problems it is essential to understand the complex adminis-
trative nature of the neighborhood school plan, the educational justifica-
tions for its use, and how its operation results in widespread racial im-
balance in the public schools.
I. THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL PLAN
The underlying object of the neighborhood school plan is for each
school in a system to function as an integral part of the neighborhood it
serves.' To accomplish this purpose schools must be located in geographi-
cal proximity to the students' places of residence. The basic problem is
the division of the whole school system into smaller, geographical attend-
ance zones by the drawing of district lines. Some of the highly inter-
related factors which must be considered when these lines are drawn in-
clude the location and size of existing school buildings, the density of
population in the surrounding areas, the necessity of travelling safety for
the children, and the distance of residences from school buildings.4 A
striking example of how these factors affect the creation of school attend-
ance zones is shown in the facts of Bell v. School City of Gary.' A public
housing project completed on an existing borderline between two school
districts increased a neighborhood's population concentration and necessi-
tated a borderline adjustment. Factors which the school board considered
in reaching a final decision included 1,200 new homes built in an adjacent
3. See Rice, Don't Manipulate Boundaries: Improve Educational Service, 72
NATION'S ScHooLs 28 (Nov. 1963).
4. PUm13c EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, THE STATUS OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCA-
TION OF NEGRO AND PUERTO RICAN CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY 8 (Oct. 1955).
5. 213 F. Supp. 819, 823-25 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963),
ccrt. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
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area which by estimate meant that slightly over one school child per home
would have to be accommodated in the near future; the existence of plans
to enlarge the capacity of a nearby school; the advantages of district lines
which are as straight as possible; and the desirability of shifting as few
children as possible from schools they were already attending, in order to
provide continuity of education. The school board had to weigh these and
other factors6 and then choose between three alternative boundaries. 7
Another problem faced by a school board in conducting a neighbor-
hood school system is whether to build new facilities or expand older
facilities in order to accommodate an increasing student population.8 Fac-
tors in addition to those involved in redrawing district lines are intro-
duced once a decision to build or expand has been reached. One such
factor is the availability and cost of suitable landsites for new buildings,'
another the degree of obsolescence and possibility of expanding existing
facilities, and yet another factor is the character of the neighborhood
which surrounds both new and existing sites, for industrial and commer-
cial settings often are not conducive to an educational atmosphere.
Two matters affect the administration of the neighborhood school
plan in a more indirect way: the type of transfer policy by which stu-
dents are permitted to attend schools outside their residential districts, and
the method of public transportation provided for students living at greater
than walking distance from school. These two problems are mentioned
only to point out that they add to the administrative complexity of the
neighborhood school plan.1" They are not the sine qua non of such a
6. Safety factors are a major problem in large cities like Gary, Indiana, where
a number of interstate highways, railroads and waterways crisscross the city.
7. A similar example was mentioned in the Gary case. The school population of
one district had grown too large to be accommodated by the one school in that district,
and neighboring schools were also crowded. A new school was built within the district.
The line separating the old district into two new districts was drawn to run east and
west. Negroes contended that if the line was drawn north and south the racial popula-
tion of the two districts would be better balanced. However, the school board pointed
out that if this were done some students would have to walk fifteen blocks to school
and pass one school within three blocks of their home. Bell v. School City of Gary,
213 F. Supp. 819, 825 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), ccrt denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964).
8. In Gary, Indiana, the school population doubled between 1951 and 1961. See
id. at 821.
9. There may be varying state requirements regarding site selection which must be
satisfied by a local school board before construction of a new school can be undertaken.
For example, in Indiana, school boards must secure the approval of the State Board of
Education by meeting minimum acreage requirements, minimum space plans in the new
building, and certain other standards, in order to erect new buildings. INDIANA STAT,
BOARD OF EDUcATION, RULES AND REGULATIONS 39-43 (1961).
10. Excellent insight into the myriad administrative details which must be coped
with by a school board, and which are not immediately apparent to the outsider, is
provided by excerpts from the trial testimony of the Gary case, quoted in Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58
Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 182-86 (1963).
NOTES
plan, as are the first two problems discussed, and the difficulties which
they generate can best be understood when discussed in connection with
their proposed use as solutions to racial imbalance."
Although the neighborhood school plan has strong roots in the his-
tory of American education, justifications for its continued use as the
basic form of administration in a school system go deeper than mere
tradition. 2 These justifications require mention, not to precipitate a
discussion of the polemics of the integration controversy, but to show
that a respectable educational theory supports the neighborhood school
plan and that school administrators are not unreasonable or capricious in
adhering to such a plan.
The rationale of the neighborhood school plan is that a child's edu-
cation to be most meaningful must constitute a part of his total com-
munity life; it should not be a tangential experience without relevance to
his other living experiences.3 The school integrates with a child's entire
life by location within his community, where administrators and teachers
can become familiar with community characteristics and can adapt their
educational methods to those characteristics.'" Educators believe that in-
dividual neighborhoods within a large city are identifiable communities
in much the same sense as are individual towns within a county. 5 This
basic premise leads to a number of specific justifications for the neighbor-
hood school. What a school can profitably teach is determined to a great
extent by the status and ambition of the students' parents; the necessity
for special courses, such as remedial reading, varies among neighbor-
hoods; parental contact with schools is encouraged, and this in turn aids
11. See text accompanying notes 98-102 infra.
12. In the Gary case it was noted that "the neighborhood school which serves the
students within a prescribed district is a long and well established institution in
American public school education. It is almost universally used, particularly in the
larger school system. It has many social, cultural and administrative advantages which
are apparent without enumeration." Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819, 829
(N.D. Ind.), affd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
13. See Rice, supra note 3. In the Gary case it was noted that in drawing attendance
lines encompassing one housing project, all children (mostly Negroes) were assigned
to one school because "it is not considered good for children of a closely knit com-
munity, such as [this housing project] . .. , to attend different schools." Bell v. School
City of Gary, supra note 12, at 823.
14. "One needs only to visit . . . a school to be convinced that the nature of the
community largely determines what goes on in the school. Therefore to attempt to
divorce the school from the community is to engage in unrealistic thinking, which might
lead to policies that could wreak havoc with the school and the lives of children. The
community and the school are inseparable." CONANT, SLUMS AND SUBuBs 20 (1961).
15. "The nature of the tasks presented to school administrators and teachers varies
incredibly from one neighborhood to another. As the problems vary, so the solutions
vary, and no set of administrative decisions in the central office of a district that
embraces these diverse communities can have validity for all." Id. at 54. Cf. Schhinerer
Recommends Decentralized School System for New York City, 69 NATION'S SCHOOLS
140 (Mar. 1963).
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in solving the problems of their children; transportation and safety prob-
lems are minimized, especially for young children; preparation for future
employment can be better tailored to individual needs; and problems of
administration and organization are most efficiently solved at a minimum
of expense.
Racial factors theoretically do not play a role in the administration of
the neighborhood school plan. As a practical matter, the operation of
the plan in urban areas of the North often results in a very dispropor-
tionate ratio of Negro and white students within each school. It is com-
mon knowledge that residential neighborhoods in Northern urban areas
reflect a high degree of racial homogeneity. The large Negro concentra-
tions in Chicago's South Side and New York's Harlem are prime ex-
amples, but this residential phenomenon is quite common in many other
areas ;" and, its causes are quite complex."8
When the neighborhood school plan operates in the context of ra-
cially homogeneous communities, the inevitable result is that some schools
are predominantly Negro while other schools are overwhelmingly white,
even though there is no assignment to schools on the basis of race. 9 This
phenomenon is startingly demonstrated by the Gary case where, according
to the transcript, 17 of 40 public schools, attended by 97 per cent of the
16. Conant, op. cit. supra note 14, at 23-40, 69-73. For more prosaic and at the
same time more concrete reasons given to support the neighborhood school concept see
the comments made by practicing administrators in Keep Neighborhood School, 72
NATION'S ScHooLs 18 (Oct. 1963), and Sanction Neighborhood Attendance Policy, 70
NATION'S SCHOOLS 55 (July 1962).
17. For example, the Civil Rights Commission has reported, "In Phoenix, '97%
of practically all the Negroes live within a radius of one mile of the railroad tracks or
the riverbed'; in Newark, N.J., 'approximately 83% are concentrated in 6 of Newark's
12 delineated neighborhoods' . . . ; in Indianapolis, '89% of the Negroes . . . live in an
area called Center Township.' . . ." 1963 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 163. See
also Boucher & Brooks, School Integration and Its Relation to the Distribution of
Negroes in U.S. Cities, 24 EDUCATION FoRu 185 (1960).
18. It is sometimes assumed that such residential homogeneity is the deliberate
product of private discrimination in the day-to-day commercial transfer of real estate.
However, the causes are more complex. One social scientist has said: "The formation
of such differentiated [residential] areas . . . is primarily a natural and spontaneous
process. They are the product roughly of three kinds of forces: (1) neutral forces,
such as level of income and accessibility to places of work; (2) forces of attraction,
such as wishing to live among people with whom one identifies oneself; and (3) forces
of rejection, as when people are found unacceptable or unsuitable as residents in a given
area." Blumer, Social Science and the Desegregation Process, 304 ANNALS 137 (1956).
To the same effect is 1963 Comm'N ON CivI. RIGHTS REP. 54.
19. "Concentration of colored Americans in restricted areas of most major cities
produces a high degree of school segregation even in communities accepting the Supreme
Court's decision." 1959 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 15. It should be noted that there
probably are contributing causes to racial imbalance in the schools other than racial
homogeneity in neighborhoods. These include a disproportionate white enrollment in
private schools and the increasing proportion of non-white to white population in urban
areas due to a higher birth rate and migration. "On the whole, the percentage of
minority-group children in the public schools is about double the percentage of non-
whites in the total population." 1963 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 54.
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Negro students, had Negro enrollments of 75 per cent or more.2" In New
York City, 75 of 570 elementary schools had more than a 90 per cent
Negro enrollment; 77 of the 404 Los Angeles elementary schools had
an 85 per cent or more Negro enrollment; 27 of the 127 elementary
schools in Cleveland were predominantly Negro; in Philadelphia 38 of
272 schools had Negro enrollments of 99 per cent; and 87 per cent of
the Negro students attend practically all-Negro schools in Chicago."
It is in this factual context that the legal battle over the constitu-
tionality of racially imbalanced schools has arisen.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACIALLY
IMBALANCED SCHOOLS
Since the administration of a neighborhood school system is a com-
plex matter, judicial intervention would have far-reaching consequences
in the administration of the entire public school system, and this is espe-
cially true where the relief requested by the complainants would affect the
drawing of district lines or the construction of school facilities.22 The
foreseeable consequences demand a searching consideration of whether
judicial intervention is required as a matter of law to remedy racial im-
balance in public schools. If racial imbalance is unconstitutional, the ad-
ministrative problems of adjustment must present no ultimate bar to judi-
cial redress.
In Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court held that state
law could neither require nor permit segregation of schools by race. The
southern states in general refused to comply with the decree and continued
to operate segregated schools, and the great bulk of school segregation
litigation in the period from 1954 to 1960 occurred in the South to com-
bat this situation.22 While dicta abound in these cases that the original
Brown decision does not require integration but only prohibits state en-
forced segregation, courts nevertheless were forced to grant remedies
which required integration since school boards continued admission clas-
20. Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819, 821 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). See also Kaplan, supra note
10, at 158.
21. Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 Vn.L. L. REv. 353, 354-55
(1961). See also Boucher & Brooks, supra note 17.
22. For example, the decision in Taylor v. Board of Education, 191 F. Supp. 181
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961), ultimately
precipitated a total reorganization of the New Rochelle school system at a substantial
cost in both financial and personnel resources. See the discussion in Kaplan, Segre-
gation Litigation and the Schools: Part I-The New Rochelle Experienwe, 58 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1, 59-66 (1963).
23. The most helpful material on this aspect of the school segregation problem
can be found in the Comu'x oN Cymi RIGHTs REP's for 1959 and 1961. An extended list
of the most important cases can be found in [1961] 2 Com'N oN Cn. RIGHTs REP.
249. The most complete coverage is in the RACE RELATioNS LAw REPORTER.
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sifications by race.2"
Prior to 1960 few cases in the North arose out of the Browr deci-
sion. 5 The major impact which that case had on the North began to be
felt as a result of increasing dissatisfaction with the condition of racially
imbalanced schools arising from the use of the neighborhood school plan.
This dissatisfaction first took the form of lawsuits against local school
boards for intentionally conducting segregated school systems,2" and in
many of these cases school boards were found to have gerrymandered
school district lines and built facilities with the intent to perpetuate racial
separation.27 Courts had little difficulty in ruling these intentional prac-
tices unconstitutional segregation within the meaning of Brown; and most
decrees followed the trend of those remedies necessitated in the South in
that they required admission of the successful Negro plaintiffs to pre-
dominantly white schools." The gerrymander cases thus added a new
dimension to the Brown decision. They indicated that the fact of racially
imbalanced schools was sufficient in and of itself to require judicial scru-
24. See, e.g., Kelly v. Board of Education, 270 F.2d 209, 226 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 924 (1959) ; Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 953 (1957); School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957) ; Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 566 (1957); Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F.2d 230,
233 (5th. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 938 (1958); Shuttlesworth v. Alabama, 162 F.
Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd on limited grounds, 358 U.S. 101 (1958); Briggs v. Elliott,
132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
That this remedial gloss was not a necessary result of the Brown decree is amply
demonstrated by the case of Brown v. Board of Education, 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan.
1955). The Board of Education of Topeka, an original defendant in the school segre-
gation cases, revised its school districts to comply with the mandate so that attendance
to Topeka schools was based on nonracial geographical districts. Its rearrangement was
upheld even though the plaintiff continued to attend an all-Negro school.
25. See Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1006 (1956); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958); Sealy v. De-
partment of Public Instruction, 159 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 252 F.2d 898 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). There were four states outside of the South
which by statute, in 1954, permitted local school boards to conduct segregated schools
if they so chose. These states were Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming.
1959 CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 158.
26. The three most important of these cases, for purposes of this note, are Branche
v. Board of Education, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) ; Taylor v. Board of Education,
191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940(1961) ; and Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr.
606 (1962). See also McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963) ; Clemons v.
Board of Education, supra note 25; Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962) ;
Shepard v. Board of Education, 207 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1962); Henry v. Godsell,
supra note 25; Sealy v. Department of Public Instruction, sapra note 25.
27. See Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1006 (1956); Taylor v. Board of Education, supra note 26; Jackson v. Pasadena
School Dist., supra note 26. Cf. Evans v. Buchanan, supra note 26.
28. See Taylor v. Board of Education, 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), a'ffd., 294
F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961) ; Clemons v. Board of Education,
supra note 27. Cf. Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 606 (1963) (court merely required that the plaintiff be admitted to another school);
Blocker v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
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tiny for transgressions of constitutional guarantees. 9 More important,
the factual findings of intent raised broad questions as to what responsi-
bility school boards had for eradicating racial imbalance in their school
systems. The actions which trial courts relied on to support findings of
intent to segregate were little more than the normal acts of administering
a neighborhood school plan."0 If these acts constituted a violation of
Brown, school boards apparently would have to do more than assign stu-
dents on a nonracial basis to avoid the prohibitions of the Brown rule; they
would have to take affirmative steps to mitigate racial imbalance."' In
fact, opinions in these cases have used broad language suggesting this
necessity.32
Additional impetus to the attack on racial imbalance has been pro-
vided by four states-California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey-
which have adopted policies requiring school boards to take affirmative
steps to reduce racial imbalance in their school systems."3 This action has
29. A detailed listing by states concerning action against "segregation northern
style" is given in Leskes, The Civil Rights Story: A Year's Reziew, 9 WAYNE L. REV.
484, 492-500 (1963).
30. See Branche v. Board of Education, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) ; Taylor
v. Board of Education, 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876,
382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963). See also Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820
(D. Del. 1962), where the court held that racial imbalance was presumptive evidence
of an intent to segregate.
31. See 1961 U. OF ILL. L.F. 741, 745 (1961).
32. The central constitutional fact is the inadequacy of segregated education.
That it is not coerced by direct action of an arm of the state cannot, alone, be
decisive of the issue of deprivation of a constitutional right. . . . The educa-
tional system that is thus compulsory and publicly afforded must deal with the
inadequacy arising from adventitious segregation; it cannot accept and indurate
segregation on the ground that it is not coerced or planned but accepted ...
The effort to mitigate the consequent educational inadequacy has not been made
and to forego that effort to deal with the inadequacy is to impose it in the
absence of a conclusive demonstration that no circumstantially possible effort can
effect any significant mitigation.
Branche v. Board of Education, 204 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"Necessarily implied in [Bromn's] . . . proscription of segregated education was
the positive obligation of eliminating it." Taylor v. Board of Education, 191 F. Supp.
181, 193 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
[E]ven in the absence of gerrymandering or other affirmative discriminatory
conduct by a school board, a student under some circumstances would be
entitled to relief where, by reason of residential segregation, substantial racial
imbalance exists in his school. . . . The harmful influence on the children will
be reflected and intensified in the classroom if school attendance is determined
on a geographic basis without corrective measures. The right to an equal
opportunity for an education and the harmful consequence of segregation require
that school boards take steps . . . to alleviate racial imbalance in the schools
regardless of its cause.
Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876, 881, 382 P.2d 878, 881, 31 Cal. Rptr.
606, 609 (1963).
33. 1963 COMIA'N ON CIVIL RIGaTs REP. 60-62. See NEW YoRK BOARD OF REGExTS,
STATEMENT ON INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN EDUcATION (1960); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
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led to a growing body of state law that racial imbalance in public schools
in and of itself is harmful and illegal.34 While this state law could not be
characterized as a binding outgrowth of the Brown case where the ques-
tion is one of federal law, it was undoubtedly in part prompted by state
interpretations of the meaning of Brown.
The above development has culminated in the question with which
federal courts are now faced: Is there a constitutional duty to achieve
racial balance in a public school system? Several writers have taken the
position that such a duty exists, 5 and the relevant federal decisions are in
conflict." Two arguments have been made to support the affirmative of
this question, and each employs school segregation history in a different
manner to support its conclusion.
The issues presented the district court in Bell v. School City of Gary
illustrate the first argument that there is a constitutional duty to integrate
the schools. The plaintiffs asked whether they and other members of
their class had "a constitutional right to attend racially integrated schools
and the defendant [had] . . .a constitutional duty to provide and main-
tain a racially integrated school system." 7  They argued that the Brown
decision in effect decreed a constitutional right to attend an integrated
363; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-22. The New Jersey Commissioner of Education
announced this policy in the series of rulings infra, note 34.
34. There are a number of New York state rulings on this point in its administrative
reports. The most important to date is Mitchell v. Board of Education of Union Free
School Dist. # 12, decided June 17, 1963, by the Commissioner of Education. See the
following decisions of the New Jersey Commissioner of Education: Fisher v. Board of
Education of the City of Orange, decided May 15, 1963; Booker v. Board of Education
of Plainfield, decided June 26, 1963; Ancrum v. Board of Education of Englewood,
decided July 1, 1963. No legal actions have been discovered as yet under recent Illinois
and California enactments. In Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876, 382
P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963), the California court referred to the new administra-
tive code provisions but the decision did not appear to be based on this, probably because
the suit was instituted and the actions complained of occurred before the rulings
were adopted.
35. The strongest and most comprehensive argument made to date supporting an
affirmative duty to integrate is in Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West:
Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 228 (1963). A somewhat more circumspect position
is taken in Maslow, supra. note 21. See also the questions raised in Note, The Dillard
Case, Desegregation and the Doctrine of Non-Integration: A Review, 49 VA. L. REv. 367
(1963). Professor Kaplan says that over twenty-five cases are now pending in the federal
courts on the theory that there is an affirmative duty to integrate. Kaplan, supra note
10, at 158.
36. Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819, 823-25 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) ; Blocker v. Board of Educa-
tion, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). The issue of an affirmative duty to integrate
was presented and passed on in Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962),
where the court rejected it. However, the result was favorable to the Negro plaintiffs in
Evans because of a finding of gerrymandering combined with a prior Delaware
policy of segregation in schools. There was an allegation of intentional gerry-
mandering in the Gary case, but the plaintiffs did not make it a major point in the
trial, and it was abandoned on appeal.
37. 213 F. Supp. at 820.
NOTES
school, and that once the fact of extensive racial imbalance in public
schools is proved, whatever its cause, there is a prima facie case for the
denial of a constitutional right. Once imbalance is established, it is con-
tended, the only question for judicial determination is what remedy the
school board must use to mitigate the imbalance.
The plaintiffs contended that if Brown was not interpreted as pro-
hibiting racial separation in public schools whatever its cause, the case
would be a nullity.3" Then it was asserted that the "trend of the law has
been to look past form for substance" in order to determine whether
school boards were complying with the Brown decision. 9 Apparently, the
point of the latter argument was that where Negro students were in fact
still segregated, the courts "looked through" the school boards' protesta-
tions of racial neutrality. Finally, the plaintiffs turned to the language of
the northern gerrymander cases and the body of state law that required
integration, arguing that these cases and laws were controlled by the
Brown decision. "It is inconceivable that the court which decided Brown
.. would . . . apply a less stringent yardstick in mandating equal
educational opportunities than that required by these three states."4
The trial court, after reviewing the facts which showed beyond doubt
that there was no intentional discrimination in Gary, determined that
Brown only prohibited a positive policy of segregation. The opinion was
affirmed in its entirety by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.4
38. "To dismiss these undisputed facts [that 97% of the Negro students attend
schools that are 77% to 100% Negro] as constitutionally irrelevant is to reduce the
concept of Brozm to a nullity. . . . What is condemned is the segregation; the fact
that it results from factors different from those before the court in Brozwt is beside
the point. The Constitution's mandate of equal protection and due process is not a
sterile and abstract legalism. . . ." Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 19, Bell v.
School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819, 823-25 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). The following language from Brown was
used to support this interpretation: "To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). It is this method
of dealing with Brown which is the basic distinction between the first argument made
for requiring integration and the second argument described in the text accompanying
notes 44-49 infra. Here the plaintiffs are arguing only questions of law. In the second
argument, they rely first on a question of fact and then proceed to argue the law.
39. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 23, Bell v. School City of Gary, supra note
38. A number of southern cases were cited to support this proposition, including:
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1956) ; Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction, 246 F.2d
913 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Bush
v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. La. 1961) ; Atkins v. School Board,
148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957).
40. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 16, Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F.
Supp. 819, (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924
(1964).
41. The trial court emphasized that in the second decision (the actual decree) of
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Supreme Court instructed the
district courts that in implementing its decision, facts such as administration, transpor-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The plaintiffs were unable to overcome the fact that Brown's decree re-
quired nonracial assignment of pupils, and the fact that classification by
geography is nonracial. The southern cases relied on by the plaintiffs can
be explained on the ground that the school boards had failed to comply
voluntarily with the mandate of the Brown decision, and in fact had de-
fied it. In the face of refusal to apply nonracial criteria southern courts
had little recourse but to require the school boards to admit otherwise
qualified Negro students to any school. But it does not logically or le-
gally follow that this remedy must be granted where nonracial assignment
classifications are used. As to the language relied on in the gerrymander
cases, it is limited by the facts of those cases.2 Where school boards
purposely use their administrative powers to separate the races it is proper
to strike down this discriminatory policy, but the remedy is inappropriate
where there is no intentional separation of the races. Finally, the state
cases which required integration of state schools could not be determina-
tive of federal law and binding on the federal courts. It is not clear
whether these state decisions emanate from theories of state educational
policy or from interpretation of the state law of civil rights, but, in either
event, federal law would be unaffected. Federal law does not dictate a
uniform educational policy for all states, and, alternatively, the states
may guarantee broader rights to their citizens than the federal constitu-
tion requires."
The second argument contends not that the holding of Brown itself
requires integration, but rather that the underlying rationale of Brown
requires this result.44 It is argued that Negro children suffer harm when
they are forced to attend racially imbalanced schools which denies them
the equal protection of the laws. The harm is defined as the denial to
the Negro of contact with members of the majority race which results in
feelings of inferiority, and the implicit assumption is that it is the same
harm as was present in the factual foundation of Brown."' The gerry-
tation, physical plant and school attendance districts could be taken into consideration
in achieving "a system of determining admission to the public schools on a non-racial
basis." Id. at 301. The court also relied heavily on Brown v. Board of Education,
139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955), discussed in note 24 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 41 smpra.
43. For example, Indiana required defense counsel at public expense for indigent
defendants long before that was a requirement under the fourteenth amendment. See
Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1944); Knox County Council v. State
ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940); Hendryx v. State, 130 Ind.
265, 29 N.E. 1131 (1892).
44. The clearest advocate of this position to date is Sedler, supqra note 35. Ap-
parently this line of reasoning was also used in Blocker v. Board of Education, 226
F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
45. This was the harm assumed by the court in the Blocker case where it was said:
We are dealing with children in grades 1 through 6, i.e., from age 5 to 11. ...
They are not so mature and sophisticated as to distinguish between the total
NOTES
mander cases and the policies of states requiring affirmative integration
are also cited to support this interpretation of the harm in Brorn.46  Two
lines of reasoning are urged to support state responsibility for racial im-
balance in the absence of a positive policy of segregation. The first em-
ploys reasoning analogous to that used in the decision of Shelley v.
Kraemer."7 The contention is that racially homogeneous neighborhoods
are the result of private discrimination, and when the state requires stu-
dents to attend schools in such neighborhoods it sanctions that discrimina-
tion.48 The second line of reasoning is that when a school board is found
to have knowledge of racial imbalance in its school system it is presumed
to know the harm which results to Negro students by this imbalance. By
requiring Negro students to attend racially imbalanced schools with
knowledge of the harm that results to them, the school board's failure to
remedy the situation, it is contended, is really the cause of that harm.49
separation of all Negroes pursuant to a mandatory or permissive state statute
based on race and the almost identical situation prevailing in their school
district. The Valley situation generates the same feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community as was found by the Supreme Court in Brozwn
to flow from substantially similar segregation by operation of State law.
Blocker v. Board of Education, supra note 44, at 229.
A number of other authorities have made this assumption about the harm in Brownt.
Sedler says that "the ratio decidendi of the case [was] . . . that segregation in the
publicly operated schools causes feelings of inferiority due to race and denies equal
educational opportunities by preventing contact with white students." Sedler, supra note
35, at 231. Sedler later maintains that "there is nothing to indicate that actual segregation
is not equally harmful to the minority child, though not required by positive law or the
board's policy. To the child the segregation is required by the state just as effective
[sic] as if due to a policy of segregation." Id. at 255. Maslow, supra note 21, at 355,
agrees that "the conclusion [of Brown) . . . that racial segregation of children in
public schools 'has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of
Negro children' was not limited to segregation imposed by law." The Jackson and
Branche cases both accept the factual conclusion that racially imbalanced schools
produce the same harm as that involved in the Brozwn case. It is possible that this
belief is also behind the adoption of an affirmative policy of integration by certain states.
And cf. In re Skipwith, 14 Misc.2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Domestic Rel. Ct. N.Y. City
1958).
46. See Sedler, supra note 35, at 261-63; Maslow, supra note 21.
47. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Supreme Court held in Shelley that state courts could
not enforce private racially restrictive covenants on real property, for such enforcement
is "state action" and is thus proscribed by the fourteenth amendment.
48. Sedler, supra note 35, at 230 n.14 says: "As Shelley indicates, the state may
not directly make acts of private persons in discriminating effective. It reinforces such
acts, however, when it insures that if private persons are able to keep the neighborhoods
residentially segregated, the state will do so in the operation of its schools."
49. This line of reasoning was apparently relied on by the court in the Branche case:
Failure to deal with a condition as really inflicts it as does any grosser imposition
of it...
[Ilt is not enough to show that residence accounts for the fact
of segregation and to contend that therefore the segregation is ineluctable.
The effort to mitigate the consequent educational inadequacy has not been
made and to forego that effort to deal with the inadequacy is to impose it. ...
204 F. Supp. at 153. Note that this language also seems to assume the validity of the
Shelly v. Kramer analogy mentioned in note 48 supra. Sedler, supra note 35, at 257,
also exhibits this reasoning:
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That Negro students suffer harm (and the same harm as the Brown
plaintiffs) by attending racially imbalanced schools appears to be based on
a fundamental misconception of what a legal harm is. There is a distinc-
tion between harm in the general sense that children are not receiving the
best possible education, and harm which is the legal injury of fourteenth
amendment protection-that some children are getting an education in-
ferior to that of other children because an arbitrary classification is being
applied to them. To convince a school board that it should repudiate the
neighborhood school plan, it can be argued that a certain educational
theory or experience is the best way to educate children in public schools
and that children are harmed in not being properly educated. But, if it
is argued to a court that pupil plaintiffs are harmed for purposes of ob-
taining legal relief, such as an injunction against the school board, the
argument must be that students are receiving differential treatment in the
public schools and that the treatment is arbitrary." Proponents of the
position that there is an affirmative duty to integrate use harm in the
former sense, and not in its legal connotation. The plaintiffs in Brown
argued that because they were being educated separately and were receiv-
ing differential treatment solely because of their race, state-enforced ra-
cial classification for schooling was arbitrary2 But Negro students are
not treated differently from other students when required to attend a
neighborhood school; all pupils, regardless of their race, are required to
attend their neighborhood schools. The classification system of the
neighborhood school plan is not arbitrary, as its policy justifications
show.52 Since the educational policy underlying the neighborhood school
plan is independent of racial considerations, the plan provides similar edu-
cational opportunities for both Negro and white students. The benefits
IT]he question [is] . . . can the state still educate him [the Negro student]
on an integrated basis thus providing equal education opportunities and preventing
feelings of inferiority and at the same time effectively operate its educational
system.
Where a state can accomplish its object without causing interference with
a recognized right, but chooses a method which, while accomplishing the object,
also interferes with that right, its failure to choose the reasonable alternative
constitutes a denial of due process. (Italics in the original.)
50. This is the standard which differentiates the protection afforded by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment from that afforded by other clauses
of the Constitution, particularly the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935) ; New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1929) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1922) ; Quong Wing
v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912).
51. Thurgood Marshall, counsel for the plaintiffs, argued in the companion case
of Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954): "[This case is just another] attack on a
classification statute. This court laid down the rule in many cases that it must be
shown that there is a difference between the two classes and, too, that the statement
shows that the difference has a significance with the subject matter being legislated."
21 U.S.L. WEEK 3163 (Dec. 16, 1952).
52. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
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which result from neighborhood schools would be the same whether the
school was white, Negro, or mixed. Hence, there is no legal harm in
racially imbalanced schools in the sense of differential and arbitrary
treatment.5 3
Independent of the legal injury issue the argument for an affirma-
tive duty to integrate the public schools is erroneous in its conclusion as
to state action. A Shelley v. Kraemer analogy is inappropriate because it
simply is not the case, and in any event could not be proved in court, that
racial homogeneity in neighborhoods is caused by private discrimination.
The causes of racial homogeneity, at least in the North, are varied."
Secondly, the policy justifications for the neighborhood school plan are
independent of the racial composition of schools; therefore, a neighbor-
hood school does not imply a state sanction of separation of the races.
The second theory for state action, that of an imputed sanction of
educational harm, is also unsound because it is based on a false notion of
legal injury. Knowledge of racial imbalance is not such knowledge of a
legal injury as would justify a finding of state causation. Knowledge
of racial imbalance cannot evidence an intent to segregate by race where
the cause of the imbalance is not racial, but legitimate classification.
When a school board operates more than one school, pupil assignment
must be made by some type of classification. Brown declared only that
race is not a legitimate classification, but the assumption in the second
Brown decree that is supported by later federal decisions is that geographi-
cal districting definitely is legitimate."
While the foregoing theories fail to demonstrate that Brown is ap-
plicable to the problem of racial imbalance and the neighborhood school
plan, this does not mean that a more suitable analysis of Brown might not
affect the problem. The above analysis has shown that the holding of
53. This conclusion assumes, of course, that the neighborhood school plan is
administered in good faith, so that all schools are treated alike. A showing that there
is discrimination against one school would bring other principles into play, as dis-
cussed in notes 84-S9 infra and accompanying text. Even a contention that racially
imbalanced schools cause harm in a general sense is open to controversy. There is social
science authority indicating that predominantly Negro schools may provide inferior
education when measured in terms of pupil achievement. Much of the same authority,
however, also indicates that the cause of the inferiority is not racial imbalance. The
best review of this literature in a legal publication is found in Kaplan, supra note 10,
at 192-204.
54. See note 18 supra. The defendant school board in Blocker v. Board of
Education, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), made one ground of its defense that the
Negro community had voluntarily segregated itself in one residential area. The judge
dismissed this contention on the ground that they had to live there as a matter of
economic necessity, and thus assumed that this disposed of the state action problem.
55. In the second Brozon decision (the actual decree), the Supreme Court said that
school attendance districts could be used "to achieve a system of determining admission
to the public schools on a non-racial basis." 349 U.S. at 301. Cf. Brown v. Board of
Education, 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955).
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Brown is inapplicable; therefore, the alternative is to determine the legal
injury at the basis of Brown and compare this injury to the alleged harm
of racial imbalance.
The confusion in defining this legal injury is illustrated by the two
different arguments which have been made for the unconstitutionality of
racially imbalanced schools. Proponents of the first argument contend
in effect that the legal injury in Brown consisted of the denial of a funda-
mental right, namely, the right to attend an integrated school." Advo-
cates of the second argument rely on the social science and expert educa-
tional testimony in the Brown record and the opinion's now famous foot-
note 11,17 and argue that the legal injury of the case was actual psycho-
logical damage to the plaintiff because of feelings of inferiority caused
by denial of contact with members of the majority race."8 Two sources
of information are helpful in delineating the real legal injury at the
foundation of Brown: one is the group of cases concerned with racial
questions which preceded Brown, and the other is the record of the Brown
case itself.
It was early recognized that the primary purpose of the fourteenth
amendment was to protect the newly emancipated Negro race from dis-
criminatory state action.59 It was not clear initially, however, what limits
would be placed upon the state action concept."9 An early case, Strauder
v. West Virginia,61 strongly indicated that the scope of the equal protec-
tion clause was broad where a possible infringement of Negro rights was
concerned, for Strauder held that simply singling out the colored race was
a legal discrimination.62 However, in Plessy v. Ferguson6" the Court de-
termined that discrimination could not be inferred from the face of a
56. Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819, 820 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
57. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
58. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
59. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
60. The first explicit formulation of the concept of state action as a limitation
on the scope of protection of the fourteenth amendment was given in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). "It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment"
Id. at 11. For an indication of the technical difficulties in the state action concept
compare Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See generally, Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
CoLum. L. Rxv. 1083 (1960).
61. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
62. In Strauder the Court said: "The very fact that colored people are singled
out . . . is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
members of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure all others." Id. at
308. The court held that exclusion of Negroes from juries violated the fourteenth
amendment. Cf. Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
63. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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segregation statute. 4 As long as Negro facilities were equal to white
facilities, the Court thought that there could be no legal injury sufficient
to warrant a judicial invalidation of state legislation. Although the Plessy
doctrine of "separate but equal" has aroused considerable controversy as
to whether it was a legitimate constitutional doctrine,6 5 it was possibly
nothing more than a particularized statement of the constitutional doc-
trine that governmental legislation is entitled to a presumption of con-
stitutionality until proven otherwise."6 The Court limited its role in se-
curing to the Negro protection from discrimination to those rights which
traditionally had been afforded constitutional protection; other racial
state action could be enjoined only on a showing of actual harm."r Thus,
in the period prior to 1935, the Court vigorously protected the rights of
property, voting, engaging in a business enterprise, and fair criminal
process from interference because of race. In matters which did not have
an aura of fundamental freedom, such as public transportation and edu-
cation, segregation statutes were not found to impose any substantial
hardship upon Negroes subject to them.6"
After 1935 the Court began to enforce more strictly the equality
guarantee of the separate but equal formula.69 When the Court squarely
64. The Court concluded that the segregation statute it confronted did not imply
on its face the inferiority of the Negro race and, hence, was not a discrimination against
the Negro. Viewed in this light "the case reduces itself to the question whether the
state is a reasonable regulation." Id. at 550-51. The Court decided that it could not say
the legislative judgment was unreasonable.
65. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 17-31, Brown v. Board
of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
66. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) is perhaps the earliest clear
statement of this presumption. A comprehensive survey of the cases developing thisdoctrine and its corollary, that one who assails the constitutionality of a statute must
show that it does not rest on any reasonable basis, can be found in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 257 (1927), in both the majority and concurring opinions. Cf. Freund, Review
of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SuPRME COURT An SUPREME LAW 47 (Calm ed.
1954).
67. The Court limited the holding of the Strauder case to "political" rights, asdistinguished from "civil" rights. 163 U.S. at 545. Apparently it chose to ignore
the suggestion in Strauder that the basis of the decision (that exclusion of Negroesfrom the jury denied equal protection) was the fact that Negroes were singled outbecause of their race. Cf. Collins v. Walker, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2474 (1964).68. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (criminal process); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932) (criminal process) ; Gong Lur v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1928) (educa-
tion) ; NLxon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (voting); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.86 (1923) (criminal process); South Covington & C. St. Ry. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S.399 (1920) (public transportation); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)(property) ; Guinn v. U.S., 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (voting) ; Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0.Ry., 218 U.S. 71 (1910) (public transportation); Cumming v. Board of Education,
175 U.S. 528 (1899) (education); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (business);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (criminal process).
69. Separate but equal had never really been a successful doctrine in practice and,
while flagrant inequalities abounded, was often paid nothing more than lip service.In some cases the "equal" Negro schools were so separate as to be invisible. SeeCumming v. County Bd. of Education, supra note 68. Even where separate facilities
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faced the issue of the constitutionality of segregation for the first time
since the Plessy decision in Brown, there were two lines of constitutional
cases which placed the issue in a new focus: those cases which cast doubt
on the constitutionality of any racial legislation,"0 and those which held
that under certain circumstances segregation would not be constitutional. 1
It is submitted that in Brown the Court took a position on fundamental
rights which was rejected in the Plessy decision-that not only did the
fourteenth amendment secure such traditional rights as property and free
speech to minority races, but it also created the new right to be assimilated
into American society with its benefits, free from any burdens of racial
did in fact exist, as a matter of general administrative practice on the part of the
states up until the decision in the Brown case, Negro schools received depressingly little
attention in comparison to the white schools. Factual descriptions and statistics of
blatant inequalities between Negro and white schools can be found in HILL & GREENBERG,
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO DESEGREGATION ch. 3 (1955) ; Caliver, Segregation in Anzerican
Education: An Overview, 304 ANNALS 17, 18-21 (1956); Kaplan, School Segregation
Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The Genteral Northern Problem, 58 NwV. U.L. REV.
157, 163 (1963).
Judgments were inconsistent, sometimes patently obvious inequalities were found
not to violate "separate but equal," and more subtle comparisons invited the judges
to throw up their hands in resignation. Compare Carter v. School Board, 182 F.2d 531
(4th Cir. 1950) ; Butler v. Wileman, 86 F. Supp. 397 (D.C. Tex. 1949) ; Pitts v. Board
of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949) ; Reynold v. Board of Education, 66
Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903) ; Williams v. Zimmerman, 172 Md. 563, 192 Atl. 353 (1937) ;
Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N.C. 33, 52 S.E. 267 (1905); Moore v. Porterfield,
113 Okla. 234, 241 Pac. 346 (1925).
70. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948). In McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) and
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court made statements based on the tacit
understanding that segregation is not separation by mutual agreement, but rather it is
exclusion from the common marketplace of life imposed on a minority race by the
state. In Sweatt the Court said:
It may be argued that excluding petitioner from [the white] school is no
different from excluding white students from the [Negro] law school. This
contention overlooks realities. It is unlikely that a member of a group so de-
cisively of the majority, attending a school with rich traditions and prestige
. .. , would claim that the opportunities afforded him for legal education were
unequal to those held open to petitioner.
339 U.S. at 634. In McLaurin the Court said:
It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position when these re-
strictions are removed, for he will still be set apart by his fellow students.
This we think irrelevant. There is a vast difference-a Constitutional
difference-between restrictions imposed by the state which prohibit the in-
tellectual commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle
where the state presents no such bar. . . . [T~he state will not be deriving
appellant of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his
own merits.
339 U.S. at 641.
71. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373 (1946) ; Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). In these cases the
Court found grounds in the commerce clause or statutes of Congress enacted under
that clause, instead of in the fourteenth amendment, to invalidate segregation in inter-
state transportation. Segregation in graduate schools was precluded by holding that
adequate opportunity for intellectual interaction with one's contemporary students is
essential to a professional education. Sweatt v. Painter, slupra note 70, at 634. McLaurin
v. Board of Regents, supra note 70.
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discrimination."2
In the Brown case, though Negro children had not been denied free
public education which was granted children of other races, the assign-
ment of Negroes to a separate school because of their race constituted an
integral part of a general plan to restrict the opportunities of the Negro
children within the community. Assignment of children to a free but
separate public school was a discrimination because its purpose reflected
a community denial of opportunities to Negro children which were granted
to white children.
Because an essential purpose of American education is to aid ad-
vancement within the community, and since opportunities for such ad-
vancement were substantially restricted for Negro children, the state of
Kansas had denied an essential meaning of education to children solely
because they were Negro. It was this broader conception of restricting
the opportunities open to children because of their heritage which caused
the Supreme Court to move away from Plessy. A continued guarantee
only of equal public education facilities would not have removed the re-
strictions upon Negro children to enjoy the opportunities of a free edu-
cation. These restrictions could be removed only by declaring all state
policy on the basis of race constitutionally invalid.
In this analysis a broad fundamental right against discrimination on
the basis of race was fashioned, and its deprivation does not require a
showing of a specific denial of privileges or consequential injury on ac-
count of race in order to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.
This is not required because the broader constitutional right against dis-
crimination on account of race is supported by the conception of a gen-
eral restriction on opportunities which are open to other races within the
American community. It may be suggested that the social science au-
thority in the Brownb record was sufficiently cogent as to the effects of
segregation in gewral to require the state to adduce some affirmative evi-
dence justifying segregation.7" Surely authoritative opinion is wide-
spread that segregation results in a "massive disadvantaging of the Ne-
gro." 4  The plaintiffs in Brown at least made a record that established
72. Compare Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960) ; Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960) ; Pollack, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); VWrechsler, Toward Neutral Prnciples of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
73. Cf. Appendi-x to Appellant's Brief in Brown v. Board of Education in The
Effects of Segregation and the Consequentces of Desegregation: A Social Science
Statement, 37 MiNN. L. REv. 427 (1953). An examination of the trial transcripts reveals
that most of the social science testimony was directed toward segregation in general,
rather than only at segregation in education.
74. See Black, supra note 72, at 424-28.
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some foundation in fact for believing it to be true."5 Faced with this
record and a prior warning from the Supreme Court that racial classifi-
cation was not to be viewed with favor, the defendants would have been
prudent to have offered some testimony in support of the reasonableness
of segregation." However, the record is notably bare of any attempt to
show that the state effort was for education rather than for subjugation. 7
This interpretation of Brown necessarily means that the equal pro-
tection clause has a substantive character analogous to that of the due
process clause, a prospect forecast five years before the Brown decision.7
Admittedly, one cannot point to specific language in Brown which for-
mulates a fundamental right to be free from racial discrimination. How-
ever, there are two points in the Court's opinion which suggest such a
result. In laying the groundwork for its interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment's effect on segregation, the Court implied that the separate
but equal gloss upon the equal protection clause was incompatible with the
75. For interesting articles discussing the role of social science testimony in the
school segregation cases see Cahn, Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 182 (1956); Calm,
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1955) ; Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism
of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. Rv. 224 (1960); van den Haag, Social
Science Testitnny in the Desegregation Cases-- Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark,
6 VILL. L. REv. 69 (1960).
76. Even though the data adduced [to support the reasonableness of the legisla-
tive action] are presented not to demonstrate the truth of the facts but only
to establish a respectable challenge the data ought to be presented on the record,
giving an opportunity to discredit or refute the body of opinion so offered.
Moreover, it may be thought that to open up the legislative judgment in even
this limited way is to weaken the presumption of constitutionality. But to this
objection there is the answer that the presumption is indulged by a court more
comfortably when buttressed with some evidence; and besides, the amassing of
the legislative facts becomes part of the process of education, self-scrutiny, and
if necessary self-correction in which the courts, the profession, and the public
are participants.
Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW
47 (Cahn ed. 1954).
77. Only one defense brief out of the many filed made what could be regarded as
an adequate attack on the plaintiffs' evidence by questioning their experimental pro-
cedure. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee, pp. 19-37, Briggs v. Elliot, consolidated with
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). This method of defense does not, of
course, serve the purpose of showing the reasonableness of the state's action as would
a showing in the record that the plaintiffs' conclusions are in fact wrong (or there is
substantial reason to believe them wrong), or showing in the alternative that there
is an adequate justification for the state's action. This appears to be the crux of Thurgood
Marshall's argument for the plaintiffs before the Supreme Court:
He cited testimony presented in the district court to the effect that there are
'no recognizable differences from a racial standpoint between children, and
that if there were such a difference which would be recognizable, and connected
with education, it would be so insignificant as to be unworthy of anybody's
consideration. . . . So here we have a record that has made no effort what-
soever to support the legislative determination of South Carolina.'
21 U.S.L. WEEK 3163 (Dec. 16, 1952).
78. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. RaY.
341, 364 (1949).
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absence of discrimination which that clause required."9 When it related
its decision to Plessy, the Court did not treat that case as stare decisis on
the question at issue, but as resting on an assumed state of facts as to
the effect of statutes which draw racial classifications."0 By construing
the holding of Plessy in this manner, the Court decided the issue of the
discriminatory effect of the statute on the basis of the record without a
pro forma overruling of Plessy. This approach appears to test the va-
lidity of a statute by its general discriminatory effect on the Negro in
addition to its particular discrimination by its very object."'
If racial discrimination by denial of opportunities rather than by
particular psychological or educational damage is the legal injury at the
basis of the Brown decision, this injury, and hence the case, bears no re-
lationship to the situation of racial imbalance in the neighborhood schools.
In the racial imbalance context the challenged state action is use of the
neighborhood school plan. This plan in theory is wholly unrelated to
questions of race, and hence could not be discriminatory in the absence of
intentional segregation. Furthermore, because it is reasonably related to
an educational objective, the plan is not arbitrary. Since racial imbalance
79. The court said: "In the first cases in this Court construing the fourteenth
amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing
all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of 'separate
but equal' did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v.
Ferguson. . . . American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half
a century." 347 U.S. at 490-91.
80. The Court in Brown noted findings of the Delaware and Kansas courts that
segregation results in inferior educational opportunities for Negro children and stated:
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. [Here is the
famous footnote 11.] Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected." Id. at 494-95. The only language in Plessy to which this observation could
refer is the contention that segregation laws, on the face of the statutes, do not necessarily
imply inferiority of the Negro race. 163 U.S. at 544. In Brown, however, the plaintiff
did not argue that the statute on its face imposed a burden on the Negro, but rather
argued and established a record that the effect of a segregation statute discriminated
against him. Thus the Court's reference in Brown to the language in Plessy can be
interpreted to mean that once it has been shown that segregation adversely affects the
freedom of the Negro the neutrality on the face of a segregation statute must be supported
further by evidence from the state.
81. Collateral support for the proposition that Browm formulated a fundamental
right is found in its companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954):
"Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to
pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective. Segrega-
tion in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective,
and thus it imposes on Negro children . . . a burden that constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty." Id. at 498. The unarticulated premise in that syllogism is
that segregation imposes restrictions on one's liberty. Thus it can be said that one
has a fundamental right to be free from racial restrictions.
It might be noted that one week after deciding Browun the Supreme Court referred
to the decision as the Segregation Cases, not the "School' segregation cases, and cited
them as authority in three per curian decisions: Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of
Control, 374 U.S. 971 (1954) ; Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) ; and Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
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in Northern schools is fortuitous, a prima facie case of state interference
with the right to be free from racial discrimination cannot be established,
nor can the plan be held to constitute state support to private discrimina-
tion as the socio-educational principles which underlie the plan are racially
neutral." It must be concluded that the Brown case has no application to
the problem of racially imbalanced schools.
This conclusion does not mean, however, that there are no legal
principles applicable to the problems of racially imbalanced schools. It
is commonly assumed that the answer to the problem of racial imbalance
lies in the Brown decision, so the case of Sweatt v. Painter" has been
generally ignored as a legal basis for invoking the equal protection clause
in an effort to end de facto segregation. Actually, the latter case is espe-
cially relevant to one of the major problems involved-the existence of
unequal facilities.
Even prior to the Brown decision there was a substantial amount of
constitutional litigation involving public education and the equal protec-
tion clause.8 4 The primary issues settled in these cases were clearly set
forth in Sweatt v. Painter: (1) where a state establishes a system of pub-
lic education it must provide equal educational opportunities for all per-
sons; (2) a plaintiff who is denied admission to a state educational in-
stitution must prove the denial was arbitrary; and (3) the plaintiff must
prove that the facilities which were available to him within the state are
actually inferior to those of the institution where he was denied ad-
mission. 5
In Sweatt the Court purposely refrained from re-examining the doc-
trine of Plessy v. Ferguson with respect to segregation in public educa-
tion. 6 The issues in the case turned on the equality or inequality of fa-
cilities, and race was essential only insofar as it was determined that ad-
mission solely on that basis was arbitrary. The Court held that where
82. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
83. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The facts of Sweatt were that Texas maintained separate
law schools for white and Negro students. The Negro school had only recently been
opened and the facilities there were demonstrably inferior to those of the white school
at the University of Texas. Sweatt applied for admission to the University of Texas
Law School and was denied admission solely because of his race. The Supreme Court
held that because the Negro law school was shown to be inferior to the white school
Sweatt was denied the equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.
His admission to the University of Texas Law School was ordered.
84. McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
supra note 83; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) ; Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590
(1935).
85. For its espousal of the first proposition see 339 U.S. at 635 where the Court
cites Sipuel v. Board of Regents, supra note 84, and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
supra note 84.
86. 339 U.S. at 635.
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one state-supported school is demonstrably superior to a second a person
may not be refused admission to the superior school on an arbitrary
standard, and race is an arbitrary standard. In Brown it was established
that a person may not be refused admission to a public school solely on
the basis of race. Where admission standards operate on this basis a
showing of actual inequality is unnecessary. Most important for present
purposes is that where admission is not based on a racial standard the
principles of Sweatt should still apply to public school litigation.
It is asserted that a major problem of racially imbalanced schools is
that Negro schools are often inferior to the white schools in a number
of respects :"7 buildings are run down, classrooms are overcrowded, cur-
ricula are limited, and teachers are less experienced. These conditions do
not occur overnight, but are the result of long-term developments within
a school system and can be both predicted and averted with careful plan-
ning by a school board. When schools in some parts of a city become
markedly superior to others which the school board has allowed to de-
teriorate, it could be maintained that assignment to schools on the basis
of residential area is arbitrary and a denial of equal protection."8 This
theory would place a burden of proof on a plaintiff to show actual in-
equality between schools. If the burden can be met the approach could
provide a solution to those cases where unequal facilities actually do
exist.8" However, it would seem that the remedy of admitting students
to those schools shown to be superior could be required only as long as
inequality existed. When inequality was eliminated, assignment by
geography would no longer be arbitrary.
III. AFFIRMATIVE INTEGRATION BY SCHOOL BOARD OR COURT ORDER
The foregoing discussion has centered on the legal problems in-
volved in challenging the constitutionality of racially imbalanced schools.
While these problems deserve primary attention, affirmative action by a
court or school board to mitigate racial imbalance is a matter which also
requires discussion.
87. See Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 V1I.L. L. REv. 353, 371-73
(1961) ; [1961] 2 Comm'N oN CIVIw RIGHTs REP. 111-15.
88. The plaintiffs in the Gary case apparently had such a contention in mind
when they presented as their second question for determination: "Whether the defendant
is discriminating against the plaintiffs and the class they represent by providing inferior
facilities in all respects, including but not limited to overcrowded and larger classes,
and unequal recreational and extra-curricular facilities." 213 F. Supp. at 820. However,
the plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of proof and the point was subsequently
abandoned on appeal.
89. Plaintiffs have been successful in a number of cases which turned on the
issue of unequal facilities. See Pettit v. Board of Education, 184 F. Supp. 452 (D. Md.
1960) (unequal curricula) ; In re Skipwith, 14 Misc.2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Domestic
Rel. Ct. N.Y. City 1958) (unequal teaching facilities); Wooley v. Spalding, 293 S.W.2d
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The problems in the context of affirmative integration are ones of
policy and remedy. The consideration that these problems would be
given by a court in formulating a decree would necessarily be somewhat
different than the consideration they would receive from a school board
voluntarily adopting a policy of affirmative integration. Nevertheless,
difficulties faced by both bodies have a common relevance, and the
separate roles of the school board and the court should be noted."
When does racial imbalance become so undesirable that an effort at
mitigation is necessary? As might be expected, there is little agreement
among interested parties on this question. The New York Board of
Education in its initial attempt to mitigate racial imbalance in New York
City schools classified elementary schools as "segregated" if the colored
population was as high as 90 per cent or lower than 10 per cent."' The
New York Commissioner of Education later defined a racially imbalanced
school as one having 50 per cent or more Negro and Puerto Rican pu-
pils.92 The plaintiffs' expert witness in the Gary case suggested that a
school should be classified as segregated whenever its racial proportion
of Negroes fell outside the range of one-third above or below the propor-
tion of Negroes in the school system as a whole.9"
A second policy problem is how a court or school board should weigh
the relative educational advantages that can be received from integrated
schools and neighborhood schools. Educational authorities cannot agree
whether the value of an integrated school requires sacrificing the benefits
of a neighborhood school.9" Because the choice must be made between
conflicting and irreconcilable educational policies, school boards may be
in a better position than courts to resolve the question.
A third problem is the delicate job of allocating financial and per-
563 (Ky. 1956) (unequal curricula, facilities and teachers).
90. To the extent that the problems here considered affect the decisions of integra-
tion cases in the courts they may be termed problems of the judicial process, as dis-
tinguished from problems of constitutional law.
91. Maslow, supra note 87, at 360, citing NEw YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
TOWARDS GREATER OPPORTUNITY, A PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS TO THE BOARD OF EDucATIoN DEALING WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF REcOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON INTEGRATION 174-75 (1960).
92. 1963 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 56.
93. The judge in the Gary case felt the concept of racial imbalance was not
susceptible of legal definition and confined the meaning of segregation to "a school
which a given student would otherwise be eligible to attend, except for his race or
color, or a school which a student is compelled to attend because of his race or color."
213 F. Supp. at 829.
94. Dr. James Conant argues that the only schools which can possibly begin to
understand and serve the educational needs of culturally deprived children are those
which are located in the slum neighborhoods where the children live. While recognizing
that this means a high degree of racial imbalance, he feels that this is a necessary price
to pay for adequate education. He further contends that the benefits of integrated
education can be achieved by thoroughly integrating the teaching staffs. CONANT,
SLUMS AND SUBURBS 27-32 (1960).
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sonnel resources to produce optimum educational benefits. Any program
of integration, whatever its benefit, would require a significant expendi-
ture of these resources, and educators disagree whether the advantages
justify their cost. A growing body of evidence indicates that special
remedial programs designed to remove the educational disadvantages of
culturally deprived children in place of integrated schools can produce
significant, and in some cases even startling, beneficial results.95 But
these programs also require money, additional personnel, supplies, and
special equipment. Here also the decision is a matter of educational
judgment.
These policy problems are difficult to solve, and often cannot be
permanently resolved. In many instances a flexible approach, accom-
panied by the continued surveillance of educational expertise, is the only
way to deal with their ever-changing facets. Courts do not pretend edu-
cational expertise, and they are not able to devote the amount of time
necessary for a continuing familiarity with the problems."9 Assuming
that courts have neither the desire nor intention to supervise even a sig-
nificant proportion of the school board's conduct of local educational af-
fairs, it is difficult to envision a way in which they could intervene to
correct racial imbalance.
Even if a satisfactory rapprochement between court and school board
could be reached with regard to policy problems, remedial problems pre-
sent serious obstacles to judicial intervention. When a court provides
redress for a litigated grievance it must have a feasible method by which
to enforce its decision or give it practical effect.97 Yet, there apparently
exists no satisfactory method for achieving substantial integration in the
nation's larger school systems. None of the three suggested methods of
mitigating racial imbalance has been shown to be effective, nor have any
received the unqualified support of educators or advocates of integration.
The first of these is adoption of an open transfer policy which would
permit students to transfer as a matter of right to schools outside their
residential district whenever an opening was available. Authoritative
opinion is divided on whether such a policy encourages or hinders racial
95. For a general discussion of these programs see [1961] 2 Com'N ON Civm
RIGHTS REP. ch. 8.
96. "How can the courts weigh the value of a 30 per cent increase in integration
against a requirement that students cross a dangerous traffic artery or walk five extra
blocks? How could the courts weigh the achievement of integration through bussing
children against the greater cost and somewhat larger class size?" Kaplan, supra note
69, at 183-86.
97. This was a point made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter during oral arguments on
the Brown case: "Nothing could be worse from my point of view than for this court
to make an abstract declaration that segregation is bad and then have it evaded by
tricks." 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3164 (Dec. 16, 1952).
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mixing in the schools.9" Those in favor of such a plan argue that it per-
mits Negro students to transfer from the over-crowded Negro schools to
white schools which may be under-utilized. Opponents argue that it only
provides a means for white students to transfer from schools where they
are in a minority. Whatever the theoretical merits of the argument, the
fact is that in practice the open transfer policy is often disruptive of aca-
demic programs and does not have any appreciable effect on racial
imbalance.99
A second suggestion is to redraw district lines around schools to alter
the racial composition of districts. This alternative would be no more
successful than the first method for it could work only in scattered in-
stances and might often be transitory.' It would not affect the racial
balance in schools located in the center of neighborhoods with a high
degree of racial homogeneity.
The final remedy is massive, compulsory bussing of students to
schools outside their neighborhoods. This program would obviously
require fundamental changes in the education policies of school boards
which follow the neighborhood school plan. The administrative and fi-
nancial burdens of such a remedy are awesome. Moreover, a program of
mass transportation might not accomplish its aim. The plaintiffs' expert
witness in the Gary case suggested a plan to mitigate the racial imbalance
in the school system which was in issue, and the sole aim of his plan was
to effect as much integration as possible, ignoring all other factors.'
After redrawing as many district lines as possible, the final plan was that
6,000 students must be bussed back and forth to school daily at a cost of
$20 per bus per day. The arrangement left one school with a 99 per cent
Negro population, and Gary has a school population of only 43,000.
98. Compare Kaplan, supra note 69, at 179; Maslow, supra note 87, at 364-65; and
testimony from the Philadelphia Board of Education cited in [1961] 2 Comm'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS RE. 111-15.
99. 1963 U.S. Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 59. The following examples are
suggestive of this situation: In Philadelphia, where the school board follows an open
enrollment policy, only 5,000 out of a school population of 245,000 are attending schools
outside their residential areas. [1961] 2 Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 104. In New
York City the school board allowed students in 21 predominantly Negro and Puerto
Rican schools to transfer; only 393 of 3,000 eligible students did so. Id. at 105. And
in Newark, N.J., where there were accommodations for 690 transfers, only 182 students
actually took advantage of them. 1963 CoMM'N ON CrvIL RIGHTS REP. 152.
100. 1963 Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 58. One of the chief drawbacks to
rezoning as a method of achieving integration is that fringe areas which have a white
population living close enough to the Negro population are often changing their racial
complexion so rapidly that any attempted rezoning would have only temporary effects
on the racial balance in the schools. For example, in Gary, Indiana, the following changes
in Negro populations in schools occurred within ten years without any changes in
boundaries: 14.8% to 93.4%; 4.3% to 76.65%; 56% to 95%. No school had an ap-
preciable reduction in its Negro population.
101. 213 F. Supp. at 831.
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What conceivably could be accomplished in New York City with a school
population of 1,000,0001o2
The final problem which would face a court or school board attempt-
ing affirmative integration is determining the constitutional principles
which should guide their efforts. The principle which seems controlling
is the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. Where
a school board allows some students to attend neighborhood schools but re-
quires others to be transported great distances, equal protection as defined
may be violated." 3 Some authorities have gone even further and asserted
that any attempt to accomplish integration denies equal protection." 4
Two lines of reasoning underlie these positions. The first position
is that affirmative integration means that children would have to be as-
signed to schools on the basis of race-a violation of Brown's prohibition
of racial assignment to schools.' The second argument goes further and
contends that affirmative integration is accomplished to favor one racial
group over another, which amounts to unequal treatment and a denial of
equal protection.' Both of these contentions are erroneous. As to the
first, Brozwn's prohibition was directed expressly to racial assignment in
order to segregate the Negro, and is not controlling where race is a factor
in attempting to integrate school bodies. Here the harm of Brown, the
denial of freedom of opportunities by racial discrimination, does not exist.
The second contention appears to be founded upon a false assumption as
to the reasons for integration. Educational administrators may integrate
schools with the belief that racial balance in the schools of a system will
provide better educational experiences for all students concerned, without
favoritism being given to one race.'
IV. CONCLUSION
To say that the problem of racial imbalance does not admit of a
102. For a view that nothing can be done see Glazer, Is "Integratio" Possible
in New York Schools?, 30 COmmNTARY 185 (1960).
103. See Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819, 831 (N.D. Ind), aff'd, 324
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, U.S. (1964).
104. See Kaplan, supra note 69, at 204-07; Bickel, The Decade of School Desegre-
gation: Progress and Prospects, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 193, 216-18 (1964).
105. In Balaban v. Rubin, 40 Misc.2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963),
the trial court invalidated school districts drawn by the Board of Education of New
York City for the purpose of integrating the school bodies, on the ground that the Board's
action violated the prohibition against the use of race as a basis of admission to the
schools. This decision has been reversed. 32 U.S.L. WEEIC 2465 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar.
17, 1964).
106. Kaplan, supra note 69, at 204-07.
107. In Balaban v. Rubin, 40 Misc.2d 249, 242 N.Y.S2d 973 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963),
reversed, 32 U.S.L. Week 2465 (N.Y. App. Div. March 17, 1964), there was no indica-
tion whatsoever that the white plaintiffs suffered even any inconvenience by attending
the integrated schools, but only that they would have attended another school if the
district lines had not been readjusted to effect a racial balance.
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complete legal solution is not to say that it admits of no solution. Any
controversy which arouses strong public opinion requires a conciliation
of opposing views, and there is much to be said for reaching this con-
ciliation through the political rather than the legal process. When public
issues are formulated on a legal basis, opinion tends to crystallize in terms
of right or wrong, win or lose, all or nothing. It becames easy to abdi-
cate responsibility for a result, since both winner and loser can rely on the
authority of the judicial decree. Thus, public views become more intract-
able and less susceptible of a working compromise. Solutions are sup-
ported by moral imperatives, rather than practical effects.
There is already evidence that the school integration controversy is
approaching such an impasse. Massive school boycotts are met by self-
righteous vows to refuse to be intimidated. It must be wondered whether
either side has ever listened to the other, or if either ever reconsiders its
position. The removal of this issue from the courtroom might enable
opponents to face their differences more realistically and work for results
rather than moral vindication. This possibility, however, cannot be tested
until the legal reaches of Brown v. Board of Education have been settled.
